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Stakeholders and Conflicts of Objectives

ICAN Skills, Financial Management. Syllabus area A: Financial management function and environment.

11 min read · Updated 8 November 2026

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In this part

A company is not just its owners. A bank has lent it money and wants to be repaid. Its staff want pay and secure jobs. The government wants tax, compliance and employment. Customers want quality and price, suppliers want to be paid on time, and the community near the factory wants clean air and decent behaviour. All of them can affect what the company does, and their wishes often conflict.

This topic defines stakeholders, describes the main groups and what each wants, explains the factors that decide whose interests win, and shows the typical conflicts, including the one the whole of corporate governance is built around: the conflict between shareholders and the managers who run the company for them. The next topic covers agency theory.

Stakeholder analysis is a standard scenario skill: you are given a company, asked who has an interest and what each wants, and asked to advise on a conflict. The numbers in this topic show how a conflict can be quantified, for example the cost of a wage increase and the headroom under a loan covenant. Read financial objectives first.

In 30 seconds

Stakeholders are everyone with a vested interest in a company’s activities or performance: shareholders, directors and senior managers, other employees, lenders, the government, customers, suppliers and society. How much influence each has depends on how far its interests can be accommodated alongside others and on its power. Where interests conflict, either a compromise is found or the company acts for the most powerful group.

Typical conflicts: lenders and owners over gearing, government and company over tax, shareholders and employees over pay, profit and environmental spending. The most significant conflict in a large company is between shareholders and directors, the root of agency theory.

Who the stakeholders are, and what they want

Stakeholders are everyone with a vested interest in the activities or performance of a company. The theoretical objective of a private company may be the wealth of its owners. But other individuals and groups have an interest in what the company does and may be able to influence its objectives. They are grouped in categories, each with its own interests.

  • Shareholders. They want a suitable return and maximum wealth. Some are long-term investors interested in longer-term share price growth and dividends; others are short-term investors hoping for a quick capital gain or high short-term profit and dividends.
  • Directors and senior managers. They lead the company. Their interests are career advancement, higher income, good working conditions and personal wealth.
  • Other employees. They want salary or wages, job security and career prospects. They tend to have less influence than the directors, unless they have strong trade union representation or specialist skills the company relies on.
  • Lenders. Banks and bondholders want to protect their investment. If the company is heavily in debt, credit risk is a concern: they care about the ability to pay interest and repay the principal, and they do not want the company to borrow even more.
  • The government. It regulates commercial activity (as regulator); collects tax on profits, on employment income and on sales; wants the economy to provide employment; and may be a customer, since some companies are major suppliers to the government.
  • Customers. They have an interest in the actions of companies whose goods or services they buy and may be able to influence them.
  • Suppliers. Major suppliers may have some influence over a company’s actions.
  • Society as a whole. Concerns include business ethics, human rights, protection of the environment, preservation of natural resources and avoiding pollution. A poor reputation can lead to public pressure, new legislation or loss of customer support.

Companies therefore often state their objective as increasing shareholder wealth, but subject to satisfying other stakeholders: rewarding employees well, being a good employer, acting ethically and showing concern for social and environmental issues.

What decides whose interests count

The ability of a stakeholder group to influence what the company does depends largely on two things: how far its interests can be accommodated and do not conflict with those of other groups, and the power of the group to determine or influence the company’s objectives and strategies.

A useful way of classifying stakeholders is by power and interest:

  • a group with high power and high interest (such as a major shareholder or the lender whose consent is needed) must be managed closely
  • high power and low interest, kept satisfied
  • low power and high interest, kept informed
  • low power and low interest, monitored
Stakeholders by power and interestA two-by-two grid. Vertical: power low to high. Horizontal: interest low to high. High power and high interest: manage closely, for example major shareholders, lenders, directors and the regulator. High power and low interest: keep satisfied, for example some large customers or suppliers. Low power and high interest: keep informed, for example employees and the local community. Low power and low interest: monitor. On the side: when interests conflict, a compromise or the most powerful group wins.Keep satisfiedhigh power, low interestlarge customers, suppliersManage closelyhigh power, high interestmajor shareholders, lenders,directors, the regulatorMonitorlow power, low interestgeneral publicKeep informedlow power, high interestemployees, local communityPowerInterest

Conflicts between stakeholder objectives

Stakeholders’ interests may be incompatible. When they conflict, either a compromise is found so that each group is satisfied partly but not fully, or the company acts in the interests of the most powerful group and the interests of the others are ignored. In practice there is usually a combination: small concessions to some groups while acting mainly for the most powerful.

  • Lenders against owners over gearing. The directors and shareholders may prefer to raise new finance by borrowing, because debt is usually cheaper than equity. Existing lenders may feel the company should not borrow more before increasing equity by issuing shares or retaining profit. Loan agreements may therefore contain covenants that limit gearing to a maximum. For example, a covenant allows debt up to 100% of equity. With equity of ₦400m and debt of ₦300m (75%), a further loan of ₦150m would take debt to ₦450m, which is 112.5% and a breach.
    The most the company can borrow is ₦400m − ₦300m = ₦100m.
  • Government against company over tax. The government wants tax on profits; the company wants to minimise its tax within the law.
  • Shareholders against employees over pay. A company cannot maximise returns to shareholders and also keep employees contented with high pay. For example, a 5% rise on a payroll of ₦400m costs ₦20m; after tax at 30% the profit falls by ₦14m, which is 14 kobo of earnings on each of 100 million shares.
  • Profit against environment. A company cannot maximise short-term profit if it also spends money on environmental protection and safe waste disposal.

The most significant conflict of interest in a large company, especially a public company whose shares are traded on a stock market, is between the shareholders and the board of directors, particularly the executive directors, and other senior managers. This perceived conflict is the foundation of agency theory and of the principles of good corporate governance that developed from it, covered in the next topics.

The ideas in more depth

Why a company cannot please everyone

Resources are limited. A naira paid in wages, tax or dividends cannot be paid to anyone else, so some interests must give way. The task of management is to decide the trade-offs openly and to explain them, and the more powerful the group, the more weight its interests carry.

Why long-term and short-term shareholders differ

A long-term investor wants the company to invest for growth even if this reduces this year’s dividend; a short-term investor wants a quick gain. The same decision, such as a major investment that cuts the dividend, can therefore please one shareholder and not another.

Sources and references

  • No accounting standard governs this topic. The legal duties of directors are set out in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 and, for listed companies, in the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (see the topic on governance).

These points are stated as at 5 November 2026.

Worked examples

Example 1: a covenant. The covenant limits debt to 100% of equity. Equity is ₦400m and debt ₦300m. Required: the borrowing capacity.

  1. Maximum debt.
    100% × ₦400m = ₦400m.
  2. Headroom.
    ₦400m − ₦300m = ₦100m.
    A loan of ₦150m would be a breach (112.5%).

Example 2: a pay rise. Payroll ₦400m; pay rise 5%; tax 30%; 100m shares. Required: the effect on earnings per share (EPS).

  1. Extra cost.
    5% × ₦400m = ₦20m
    after tax ₦20m × 0.70 = ₦14m.
  2. EPS effect.
    ₦14m ÷ 100m = 14 kobo lower.

Example 3: classifying a group. A trade union represents most employees and has the power to stop production. Required: how to manage it.

  1. Power and interest. High power, high interest: manage closely, with consultation, because the union can influence strategy.

How to answer in the exam

  • Identify the stakeholder groups in the scenario and what each wants, with the evidence from the question.
  • Say which conflicts arise and which group has the power.
  • Quantify where figures allow, for example the cost of a concession or the headroom under a covenant.
  • Recommend a compromise and say how it will be communicated.

Common mistakes in the exam

  • Listing stakeholders without stating their interests.
  • Forgetting that shareholders are not a single group (short-term and long-term).
  • Ignoring the power of each group.
  • Not naming the shareholder and director conflict as the most significant.
  • Stating that employees always have little power.
  • Giving a conflict without saying how it may be resolved.

Quick revision

  • Groups: shareholders, directors and senior managers, employees, lenders, government, customers, suppliers, society.
  • Influence = accommodation of interests and power.
  • Conflicts end in compromise or the most powerful group winning.
  • Biggest conflict in a large company: shareholders and directors.

Practice questions

These are original questions written in the style of the Institute’s exams. Try each one before you open the answer. Section A is a recall check, because the paper itself is written.

Recall check: multiple choice

Question 1. Stakeholders are:

  1. Only the shareholders
  2. Only the employees
  3. Everyone with a vested interest in the company’s activities or performance
  4. Only the directors
Show the answer

C. Including those who are not owners.

Question 2. The main concern of lenders is to:

  1. Raise the share price
  2. Protect their investment and be repaid
  3. Increase wages
  4. Reduce tax
Show the answer

B. So they watch credit risk and further borrowing.

Question 3. The government is a stakeholder as:

  1. A regulator, a tax collector, a promoter of employment and sometimes a customer
  2. A shareholder only
  3. A supplier only
  4. A competitor
Show the answer

A. Each role gives it a different interest.

Question 4. A stakeholder group’s influence depends on:

  1. Its size only
  2. Its location
  3. Its age
  4. How far its interests can be accommodated and its power
Show the answer

D. These two factors decide whose interests win.

Question 5. A loan covenant that limits gearing protects:

  1. Shareholders
  2. Lenders
  3. Employees
  4. Customers
Show the answer

B. It stops the company borrowing so much that credit risk rises.

Question 6. The most significant stakeholder conflict in a large public company is between:

  1. Shareholders and directors and senior managers
  2. Customers and suppliers
  3. Employees and the government
  4. Lenders and suppliers
Show the answer

A. It underlies agency theory.

Question 7. Long-term shareholders mainly want:

  1. A quick gain
  2. High short-term dividends
  3. Longer-term share price growth and dividends
  4. No dividends
Show the answer

C. Short-term investors want quick gains.

Question 8. Employees other than directors want mainly:

  1. Dividends
  2. Share options
  3. Control of the board
  4. Salary, job security and career prospects
Show the answer

D. Their influence is often lower than the directors’.

Question 9. When stakeholder interests conflict, the outcome is usually:

  1. No decision
  2. The shareholders always win
  3. A compromise, or action for the most powerful group
  4. The lenders always win
Show the answer

C. Often a mixture of the two.

Question 10. Society as a stakeholder is concerned with:

  1. Ethics, human rights and the environment
  2. Dividends
  3. Interest rates
  4. Share prices
Show the answer

A. A poor reputation may lead to public pressure.

Section B style: written questions

Question 11 (10 marks). (a) State FIVE categories of stakeholders and what each wants. (5 marks) (b) State the two factors that decide a stakeholder group’s influence. (2 marks) (c) State how conflicts between stakeholders may end. (3 marks)

Question 12 (15 marks). A loan covenant limits debt to 100% of equity. Equity is ₦500m and debt ₦450m. (a) Calculate the current gearing. (3 marks) (b) Calculate the maximum new loan. (4 marks) (c) The directors want a new loan of ₦100m. State whether they may take it and what the lenders’ and shareholders’ positions are. (8 marks)

A further written question

Question 13 (20 marks). Tega Plc has a payroll of ₦600m and 80 million shares; the tax rate is 30%. The trade union demands a 4% pay rise. The directors’ bonus depends on EPS, the bank has a covenant on gearing, and the government has told the company to cut emissions at a cost of ₦150m.

(a) Calculate the cost of the pay rise and its effect on EPS. (6 marks) (b) Identify the stakeholder groups and the conflicts. (8 marks) (c) State the power and interest of the union and how to manage it. (3 marks) (d) Recommend a compromise. (3 marks)

Model answers

Show the model answer to Question 11

(a) (1 mark each, any five) Shareholders:

  • return and wealth
  • directors and senior managers: career, income, personal wealth
  • employees: pay, job security, prospects
  • lenders: protection of the investment
  • government: regulation, tax, employment
  • customers: quality and price
  • suppliers: payment
  • society: ethics and the environment

(b) How far their interests can be accommodated with those of others (1) and their power to influence the company (1).

(c) A compromise (1); action for the most powerful group (1); or a combination (1).

Show the model answer to Question 12

(a) ₦450m ÷ ₦500m = 90% (3).

(b)

  1. Maximum debt 100% × ₦500m = ₦500m
  2. headroom ₦500m − ₦450m = ₦50m (4).

(c) A loan of ₦100m would take debt to ₦550m, which is 110% of equity and a breach (3). The lenders want to protect their investment and could demand repayment (2), while the shareholders and directors may prefer cheap debt to a share issue (1). The company should raise equity or retain profit first (2).

Show the model answer to Question 13

(a)

  1. Cost 4% × ₦600m = ₦24m (2)
  2. after tax ₦24m × 0.70 = ₦16.8m (2)
  3. EPS effect ₦16.8m ÷ 80m = 21 kobo lower (2).

(b) Employees want the pay rise, against the shareholders’ return (2). The directors’ bonus depends on EPS, so they have a personal interest against the rise (2). The bank wants gearing kept within the covenant, which limits borrowing to fund the cost (2). The government wants emissions reduced at a cost of ₦150m, which conflicts with short-term profit (2).

(c) A union that can stop production has high power and high interest (1.5), so it should be managed closely, by consultation and negotiation (1.5).

(d) A smaller rise, phased, linked to productivity or profit (1.5), and a phased emissions programme with an explanation to shareholders and the bank (1.5).

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All Financial Management topics

You are reading topic 3 of 75.

  1. The nature and purpose of financial management01
  2. Financial objectives: shareholder wealth, profit, earnings per share and stakeholder value02
  3. Stakeholders and conflicts of objectives03 here
  4. Agency theory and the agency problem04
  5. Achieving stakeholder objectives: governance codes, listing rules and reward schemes05
  6. Evaluating corporate objectives: ratios and total shareholder return06
  7. Financial management in not-for-profit organisations07
  8. Macroeconomic policy targets, GDP and fiscal policy08
  9. Monetary policy, interest rates, inflation and the exchange rate09
  10. Money markets, banks and money market instruments10
  11. Capital markets and the stock exchange11
  12. The bond market and technology in financial markets12
  13. Working capital: nature, elements and objectives13
  14. The cash operating cycle, working capital ratios and overtrading14
  15. Inventory management: EOQ, reorder levels, just-in-time and ABC analysis15
  16. Managing receivables: credit terms and credit control16
  17. Debt factoring and invoice discounting17
  18. Early settlement discounts and trade payables18
  19. Cash flow forecasts and reasons for holding cash19
  20. Short-term investment and treasury management20
  21. Cash management models: Baumol and Miller-Orr21
  22. Working capital investment policy and determining needs22
  23. Working capital funding strategies23
  24. Capital expenditure, payback and accounting rate of return24
  25. Relevant cash flows in investment appraisal25
  26. The time value of money: discounting and annuities26
  27. Net present value and the case for discounted cash flow27
  28. Internal rate of return and NPV versus IRR28
  29. Taxation and capital allowances in DCF29
  30. Inflation in DCF: real and money terms30
  31. Risk and uncertainty in appraisal: sensitivity analysis31
  32. Expected value and decision trees32
  33. The value of perfect information33
  34. Simulation, risk-adjusted discount rates and discounted payback34
  35. Lease or buy and borrow-to-buy decisions35
  36. Asset replacement: equivalent annual cost and the lowest common multiple36
  37. Capital rationing: divisible and indivisible projects37
  38. Short-term sources of finance38
  39. Long-term sources of finance: equity, debt, hybrids and leases39
  40. Issuing shares: public offers, placings, introductions, underwriting and buy-backs40
  41. Rights issues41
  42. Islamic finance: riba, murabaha, ijarah, mudaraba, sukuk and musharaka42
  43. Internal finance and dividend policy43
  44. Cost of equity: the dividend valuation model44
  45. Portfolio theory and diversification45
  46. Systematic and unsystematic risk and the efficient frontier46
  47. The capital asset pricing model and arbitrage pricing theory47
  48. Cost of debt48
  49. Cost of preference shares and convertibles49
  50. The weighted average cost of capital50
  51. Project-specific cost of capital and adjusted WACC51
  52. Capital gearing, business risk and financial risk52
  53. The traditional view and Modigliani and Miller without tax53
  54. Modigliani and Miller with tax, market imperfections and gearing in appraisal54
  55. Pecking order theory and choosing the financing method55
  56. SME financing problems and remedies56
  57. SME finance: venture capital, business angels, crowdfunding and supply chain finance57
  58. Why value a business: reasons and information needed58
  59. Asset-based valuation59
  60. Income-based valuation: P/E, earnings yield and EV/EBITDA60
  61. Dividend valuation of shares61
  62. Discounted cash flow valuation of a business62
  63. Valuing bonds and preference shares63
  64. The efficient market hypothesis64
  65. Practical considerations in share valuation65
  66. Foreign exchange rates and quotations66
  67. Foreign exchange risk: transaction, translation and economic67
  68. Causes of exchange rate movements68
  69. Purchasing power parity, interest rate parity and four-way equivalence69
  70. Covered interest arbitrage and forward rates70
  71. Internal hedging: invoice currency, netting, matching, leading and lagging71
  72. Forward contracts and money market hedges72
  73. Foreign currency derivatives: futures, options and swaps73
  74. Interest rate risk and traditional hedging74
  75. Interest rate derivatives: FRAs, futures, options and swaps75
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